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Abstract
Improving quality is an important element of the transfer of production to low wage
countries. Higher quality requirements are part of complex contracting arrangements in
global supply chains. This paper analyzes how weak contract enforcement institutions
and imperfect factor markets are a®ecting contracting for quality products; what the
implications are for growth and equity; and how this changes with development.
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Recent technological developments and globalization are transforming the industrial orga-
nization and international location of production.1 One of the most important mechanisms
underlying the globalization process lies in the transfer of advanced production capabili-
ties to low-wage economies. These capabilities comprise both an increase in productivity
and in product quality (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; Eswaran and Kotwal, 2007). Sutton
(2001) argues that the quality aspect is far the more important element: poor productivity
can be o®set by low wage rates, but until ¯rms attain some threshold level of quality, they
cannot achieve any sales in global markets, however low the local wage level.
The introduction of higher quality requirements in developing and transition countries
has coincided with the growth of contracting and technology transfer (Swinnen, 2007).
The past decades have witnessed a strong growth in contracting for quality production
in global supply chains with local suppliers (both ¯rms and households) in developing
and transition countries engaging in complex contracting with companies selling into high
income markets - either domestically or internationally. These contracts not only specify
conditions for delivery and production processes but also include the provision of inputs,
credit, technology, management advice etc. (Minten et al., 2007; World Bank, 2005). The
latter are particularly important for local suppliers who face important local factor market
imperfections. In particular imperfections in credit and technology markets are typically
large, which implies major constraints for investments required for quality upgrading,
especially for local ¯rms and households who cannot source from international capital
markets.
This paper is the ¯rst to formally analyze the e±ciency and equity e®ects of the
introduction of high quality production in the presence of weak contract enforcement
1One issue that has attracted much attention is outsourcing (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2005).
Another issue, more closely related to our paper is the role of vertical integration in the globalization
process. A series of models have studied under which conditions two ¯rms will vertically integrate, either
backward or forward, and how this a®ects the incentives to invest or innovate (Acemoglu et al., 2005;
Aghion et al., 2006), drawing upon the earlier work of Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986),
Hart and Moore (1990)). Some of the papers have considered the impact of weak enforcement institutions
(Khanna and Palepu, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2005). The models typically assume (a) that both ¯rms can
make investments or take over the other ¯rm (an exception is Macchiavello (2006), who allows for ¯nancial
constraints), and (b) that vertical integration is a 0¡1 decision, i.e. they compare the two extremes of total
ownership and total separation; or in Williamson (1975)'s terminology: "hierarchy" versus "markets". Our
analysis studies whether contracting (a "hybrid" form of organization in Williamson's terms) is sustainable
and what its e±ciency and equity e®ects are.
2institutions and imperfect factor markets; and how the process of development changes
these e®ects.
The enforcement of contracts for quality production is di±cult in developing and tran-
sition countries which are often characterized by poorly functioning enforcement institu-
tions. This can add signi¯cantly to the cost of contracting and which may prevent actual
contracting to take place.2 Our analysis of the equity implications relates to the vigorous
debate in the development community on the income distributional e®ects of the rapid
growth of these modern supply chains in developing countries. Some have argued that
they are reinforcing inequality and poverty as they are excluding the weakest from par-
ticipating in these vertically coordinated processes and that large and often multinational
companies are extracting all the surplus from the gains through their bargaining power
within the chains (Reardon and Berdegu, 2002; Warning and Key, 2002). Others ¯nd pos-
itive e®ects on development (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006; Wang et al., 2007). however,
all these studies are empirical, without a clear theoretical framework.
Our main ¯ndings are that factor market imperfections induce interlinked contract
arrangements, and that the extent of ine±cient separation (absence of socially e±cient
contracting) is proportional to the size of the enforcement costs and the relationship spe-
ci¯c investment. The distribution of the gains from contracting depend on the overall
rent that can be created by the contract and the enforcement costs. Transfers from one
agent to the other, which we call "e±ciency premia", play a crucial role. With positive
enforcement costs in contracting, an e±ciency premium may have to be paid by one agent
to the other in order to make the contract self-enforcing. The size of the e±ciency pre-
mium depends on the enforcement costs and on the rents created by the contract. We ¯nd
that the higher the enforcement costs and the lower the rents created by the contract, the
higher the e±ciency premium.
Moreover, we ¯nd that "development", i.e. an exogenous improvement of enforcement
institutions and of the functioning of credit markets, has non-linear e®ects on both equity
and e±ciency, and may hurt some of the contracting parties under some conditions.
Our analysis is related to other research ¯elds, in particular to research on FDI
2There is an extensive literature on the role of formal and informal enforcement institutions in devel-
opment, e.g. North (1990), Platteau (2000), Greif (2006), Fafchamps (2004), Dhillon and Rigolini (2006),
etc.
3spillovers which suggests that foreign companies are more likely to engage in vertical
integration and vertical coordination (Aghion et al., 2006; Dries and Swinnen, 2004), and
on the distribution of rents within companies, domestically (Blanch°ower et al., 1996) and
internationally (Borjas and Ramey, 1995; Budd et al., 2005). The analysis also relates to
a large body of research on interlinking markets (Bardhan, 1989; Bell, 1988) on enforce-
ment in contracts and credit markets (Genicot and Ray, 2006; Gow and Swinnen, 2001;
Mookherjee and Ray, 2002), and to the growing literature on the role of standards and
high value chains in trade and development (e.g. Ja®ee and Henson, 2004).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the basic model. Section 3
analyzes rent distribution with production contracts under perfect enforcement. Section
4 analyzes e±ciency and equity e®ects with enforcement costs, and Section 5 studies how
third party enforcement can a®ect the outcomes. Section 6 analyzes how development
a®ects the results, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a local company or household in a developing country - which we will refer to
as the local supplier - producing a quantity q of a low-quality product and selling it on
the local market at a price pl. The local market requires few or no quality standards.
For notational simplicity we set q = 1. Then, a company which is interested in selling
high-value products - which we will refer to as the processor - enters the market. The
processor could for example be a processing, trading or retailing ¯rm, either domestic
or multinational. The processor wants to buy her raw material from the supplier, but
imposes certain standards, e.g. regarding quality and safety, which are not required for
the local market. The ¯rm intends to process this raw material into high-quality products,
that can be sold at a price ph, with ph > pl.3 We call µ = ph ¡ pl the quality premium,
as it is the amount of extra money customers are prepared to pay for a product of higher
quality. If the supplier delivers his produce to the processor, the price the supplier receives
will be derived from ph, through a mechanism of rent sharing between the processor and
the supplier.
3We assume ph is ¯xed and cannot be in°uenced by the processor
4We assume that the quality of the ¯nal product is determined by the quality of the
raw material. It depends on the speci¯c inputs used in the production process of the
raw material. This is a realistic assumption, since the production of, for example, dairy
products or textiles crucially depend on the quality of their raw material (milk and cotton).
Note that our model allows for the high-quality market to involve the same commodity
as the local market, or a di®erent commodity. An example of the ¯rst is when suppliers
choose between low-quality milk production for home or village consumption and high-
quality milk for processing into high-value cheeses etc. An example of the second case
is when suppliers choose between producing cotton for gins and basic food for household
consumption or local markets.
To produce one unit of high-value products, the supplier requires speci¯c inputs (e.g.
credit, technology, seeds) with a value of I on top of his standard production cost C. I
and C are assumed ¯xed for each supplier. We assume that the speci¯c inputs for high-
quality production are not available to the supplier because of factor market imperfections.
Again, this is a realistic assumption as in many developing countries local producers and
households face important factor market constraints. These constraints e®ectively prevent
the supplier from producing high-quality raw material.
The market imperfections also hurt the processing ¯rm by constraining its supplies. If
no supplier can supply high-quality raw material, the processor is unable to sell products
in the high-quality market, and both the supplier and the processor are stuck in a low-
quality equilibrium. We assume that the processor does not consider switching to trade
in the low-quality market, e.g. because its reputation for quality is critically linked to its
brand name.
However, if the processing ¯rm has better access to the speci¯c inputs than the supplier,
the processor can act as an intermediary in the input market and provide (sell or lend) the
inputs to the supplier. This, again, is a realistic case since the processor may have better
collateral, more cash °ow or face lower transport or transaction costs in accessing the
inputs. If so, the processor will consider o®ering a contract to the supplier, which includes
the provision of inputs and the conditions (time, amount and price) for purchasing the
supplier's product. We assume that the processor provides the supplier with the full
amount of required inputs I per unit of production, or the processor does not provide any
5inputs.4
Note that in such a contract, each agent can hold-up the other agent. On the one
hand, the supplier can divert the inputs to other uses, such as selling them or applying
them to other production activities; or he may apply the inputs as agreed but then sell
the high-quality output to other buyers than the one he has a contract with. On the other
hand, the contracted buyer may also hold up the supplier by paying a lower price to the
supplier than was originally agreed on, or simply postpone payment, as has been observed
many times in reality (Swinnen, 2007).
In the rest of this paper we will show that both the creation of the surplus (i.e. whether
a contract is agreed upon and enforced) and the distribution of the contract surplus depend
on a variety of factors. The di®erent options for the processor and the supplier can be
represented by a two-player ¯nite game of perfect information and the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium can be derived through backward induction. For a contract to be feasible,
it must satisfy the participation constraints (PCi) and the incentive compatibility con-
straints (ICCi) of both agents (i = s;p). In the next sections we derive how enforcement
costs a®ect the equilibrium outcomes.
The model we use in this paper is a one-period game. There is an extensive literature
on how contract enforcement is a®ected by repeated games. It is well known that in an
in¯nitely repeated game, contract enforcement is easier to sustain, if only the agents are
su±ciently patient. We capture these e®ects by including reputation costs, which allow
for a somewhat broader interpretation of the cost of breach of contract (see further).
3 Contracting and Rent Distribution under Perfect Enforce-
ment
To establish a baseline result for comparison purposes, we start with assuming perfect
(and costless) contract enforcement. With perfect contract enforcement, none of the part-
ners will deviate from the contract once it is agreed upon. As a result, the incentive
compatibility constraint becomes irrelevant. There are only 2 necessary (and su±cient)
4This assumption implies that we do not allow for products of intermediate quality, produced by means
of a non-zero but suboptimal amount of inputs. Note that the amount I will depend on transaction costs,
productivity, current farm assets, etc.
6conditions for the interlinking contract to be feasible, namely the supplier's and the pro-
cessor's participation constraint (PCi for i = s;p), implying that Y ¸ Yl (PCs) and
¦ ¸ ¦l (PCp).
At ¯rst, the processor decides whether or not to o®er a contract with inputs on credit
to the supplier (see Figure 1). The processor will only do so if her expected income from
such a contract is higher than from any other business option she has. Second, the supplier
decides whether or not to accept the contract. He will only accept it if the contract o®ers
him a larger payo® than any other opportunity he has. If both the processor and the
supplier agree on the contract, the processor will supply her processed products to the
high-quality market.
If one of the agents does not accept the contract, the payo®s are according to the no-
trade or disagreement outcome (Yl;¦l) which is the payo® in the low-quality equilibrium,
where respective payo®s are:
Yl = pl ¡ C: (1)
¦l = 0 (2)
Yl is the income of the supplier when selling low-quality produce at a price pl per unit at
the local market with production cost C. The processor has no cost, but also no revenue,
so her pro¯ts (¦l) are 0.
If a contract agreement is reached, the processor provides inputs with value I to the
supplier, which are repaid at the time of delivery of the product. High-quality raw material
is produced, and the high-quality equilibrium is obtained, creating a surplus: the total
income with contracting exceeds the total income without contracting.
Total income (Gj) is de¯ned as: Gj = ¦j + Yj, with j = h for the high-quality
equilibrium, and j = l for the low-quality equilibrium. It amounts to the total output
value, minus production costs. In case of high-value contract production, Gh = (ph¡I)¡C:
For notational simplicity, we assume the cost and valuation of processing to be zero.
Otherwise, Gl = pl ¡ C. The contract surplus Sj is de¯ned as the extra value created
by the contract, relative to the disagreement outcome. It is obtained by subtracting both
agents' outside options from total income Gj. Hence, in the high-quality equilibrium
Sh = Gh ¡ Gl = µ ¡ I.
7Total income is shared among both agents according to a Nash bargaining process
which leads to maximization of the product of the respective agents' increments in utility
relative to their respective outside options. With perfect enforcement, the outside options
are given by the disagreement outcome (Yl;¦l).
For reasons of simpli¯cation, we assume that the agents are equally risk averse5 and
that the supplier and the buyer are perfectly informed about each other's outside options.
The contract income of the supplier equals the producer price p, minus the cost of basic
inputs C (Yh = pC). The contract income of the processor equals the remaining share of
total income (¦h = Gh¡Yh = ph¡I ¡p). The price upon which the agents agree, is then
given by the Nash bargaining solution:
p = argmaxp(Yh ¡ Yl)¯(¦h ¡ ¦l)(1¡¯) (3)
p = argmaxp(p ¡ pl)¯(ph ¡ I ¡ p)(1¡¯) (4)
We follow the standard approach in the theoretical literature in assuming a symmetric
solution with ¯ = 1
2, as pioneered by Nash (1953) in his axiomatic approach, and followed
by others like Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), Diamond and Maskin (1979), Muthoo
(1999) etc.
The maximization of the Nash product above then leads to the following results:
p = pl +
1
2
(ph ¡ pl ¡ I) (5)
Yh = p ¡ C = pl ¡ C +
1
2
(µ ¡ I) (6)
¦h = Gh ¡ Yh =
1
2
(µ ¡ I) (7)
As long as a surplus can be created by the contract (Sh = µ¡I ¸ 0), the participation
constraint of the supplier (Yh ¸ Yl) and of the buyer (¦h ¸ ¦l) are always satis¯ed. Both
agents are then at least as well o® with the contract relative to the disagreement outcome.
Note that S ¸ 0 as soon as I · µ; i.e. if the per unit additional input costs are less
5This assumes away di®erences in risk attitudes. However, if one agent is more risk averse than the
other agent, he will derive a larger utility from a small increment in income. An equal distribution of utility
gains may then translate into an unequal income distribution, with a larger share going to the risk-neutral
agent (cfr. Muthoo (1999); Osborne and Rubinstein (1990))
8than the quality premium. Hence, with perfect contract enforcement, the contract will be
chosen by both agents, and the high-quality equilibrium reached, if the quality premium
is large enough to cover the additional input costs. This is a very intuitive result.
The impact on total income (Gj) is straightforward: if I · µ, it is pro¯table for both
the producer and the supplier to contract, and Gh ¸ Gl in this case. If, on the other hand,
I > µ, an upgrade to high-quality production will be unpro¯table and no contract will
come about. In this case, Gh < Gl. Hence, with perfect enforcement, the highest possible
total income will always be achieved.
The distributional aspect relates to how total income from the contract is shared by
the agents. With the set-up of our model, this is fully dependent on the respective agents'
outside options. The better an agent's outside option, the higher the share of total income
that will accrue to him/her.
Hence, as equation 6 shows, the contract income for the supplier (Yh) increases in his
outside option (Yl) and in the net surplus of the contract (µ ¡ I).
4 Costly Enforcement
The game changes when enforcement is costly. In this case it is no longer certain that a
contract which is agreed upon will be honoured. Hold-ups may occur if one of the agents
has attractive alternatives to contract compliance. As we have said before, the supplier
may divert the inputs to other uses or sell the high-quality output to alternative buyers.
Competing processors may o®er a higher price for high-quality products, as they do not
need to count in speci¯c input costs.
With perfect foresight, the processor will anticipate such enforcement problems. She
has several options. She may modify the contract conditions, so as to make the contract
more attractive to the supplier. This will result in a kind of premium for the supplier, which
induces the supplier to comply with the contract; it renders the contract self-enforcing.
Alternatively, she may invest in external enforcement mechanisms, such as hiring lawyers
and paying for court expenditures, or hiring private enforcement agents (ma¯a or other
types), or she may invest in monitoring systems to ensure that the suppliers use the inputs
and deliver the output as agreed in the contract. If such options are either not feasible or
9too costly, she may decide not to agree upon a contract.
On the other hand, the processor may hold up the supplier. When the supplier delivers
his produce to the processor, the latter may pay a lower price than was originally agreed
upon. With perfect foresight, however, the supplier will also anticipate this problem. If
the price proposed by the processor is not credible, the supplier may invest in external
enforcement, if that is pro¯table. Otherwise, the supplier can deliberately propose an
alternative, slightly lower producer price which is credible, or refuse the contract. This
is equivalent to paying a premium to the processor in order to make the contract self-
enforcing.
To understand under which conditions contracting will be sustainable and what the
impacts are on the total surplus and on its distribution, we will start by considering the
extreme situation when there are no external enforcement institutions - which is equivalent
to assuming that external enforcement (by law or by a third party) is prohibitively costly.
The contract is then only feasible if, in addition to the agents' participation constraints,
also their incentive compatibility constraints are satis¯ed. The incentive compatibility
constraint requires that the contract is such that the agents prefer to act in accordance
with the contract without external enforcement, instead of having an incentive to breach
it. This is similar to saying that the contract is self-enforcing.
4.1 E±ciency Premium with Supplier Hold-up
Take again the case where a processor o®ers a supplier a contract which includes the
provision of speci¯c inputs, while legal contract enforcement is prohibitively costly. Once
he has received the inputs, the supplier has two options (see Figure 3): either he applies the
inputs conscientiously, which will produce the desired high-quality product the processor
needs; or he can divert the inputs to other purposes, e.g. applying them to other crops
or selling them. If he diverts the inputs, his contracted crop will be of a low quality and
will have to be sold on the low-quality market. By breaking the contract, the supplier will
su®er a loss in terms of reputation, social capital, or future business opportunities. This
reputation loss is like an informal penalty for contract breach and is represented by Ás.6
6The variable Á
s is equivalent to McLeod (2006)'s "informal enforcement mechanism" through commu-
nity norms, relationships and reputations, as opposed to formal (what we call "third party") enforcement
through courts of law, ma¯a, supervision...
10We refer to this as the contract breach outcome and the pay-o®s are (Yb;¦b), whereas
Yb = pl ¡ C + I ¡ Ás (8)
¦b = ¡I: (9)
In (8) and (9), I is the value of the speci¯c inputs that the processing ¯rm delivers to
the supplier. In the case of breach of contract, the processing ¯rm has no supplies and
su®ers a net loss equal to the cost of the provided inputs I, while the supplier's income
consists of the revenue from sales at the low-value market (pl ¡ C), augmented with the
revenue from reselling the speci¯c inputs (I), but lowered by the reputation cost Ás.
Another possibility of producer hold-ups is at the time of product sale. Once the
supplier has applied the inputs as requested by the processor, high-quality produce will
result. The supplier can still decide to sell the high-quality produce to another buyer at
the local market (see Figure 3). We assume for now that there is no other processor with
access to the high-quality market and that the local market does not pay a premium for
high quality. As a result, the supplier will only receive a price pl at the local market.7
Also in this case, the supplier will su®er a reputation loss. The processor's payo® is as
in (9), while the supplier's payo® is
Ys = pl ¡ C ¡ Ás (10)
The new outside options will act as constraints to the bargaining solution described in
Section 3 (cfr. Binmore et al., 1989). They are treated di®erently from the disagreement
payo®, as they represent opportunities that only arise after the processor has contracted
the supplier and provided inputs to him. These constraints are in fact the supplier's
incentive compatibility constraints: Y ¸ Yb (ICCs1) and Y ¸ Ys (ICCs2) need to be
7A more general model is to assume that the supplier receives °ph for high-quality produce with other
buyers, with 0 · ° · 1. The supplier's payo® is then Ys = °ph ¡C ¡Á
s. If there is no alternative demand
for high-quality products, ° = 0. If high-quality products are valued only as much as low-quality products,
° is such that °ph = pl. If other processors buy high-quality produce, °ph will be larger than pl. this
way, ° can be seen as a proxy for product speci¯city or for competition at the high-value market. In a
following working paper we will analyze this in more detail. Note that in some cases, lower prices may also
be received at the local market. Indeed, for some cash crops, there may not be a local market (yet) e.g.
in the case of broccoli and cauli°ower in Guatemala, as was described by Glover and Kusterer (1990). In
reality this has been observed in the ¯rst stages of market development, but usually after some time, the
local market starts to develop a taste for the novel product.
11satis¯ed by the contract. From (8) and (10), it is obvious that Yb > Ys hence that ex ante,
input diversion is a more attractive outside option than selling high-quality produce at
the local market hence that ICCs1 is more restrictive than ICCs2.
The processor is fully informed about the structure of the game and the outside options
of the supplier and knows that by providing the supplier with inputs, she is creating new
outside options for her supplier, who will be incited to break the contract if ICCs1 or
ICCs2 is not satis¯ed. The processor can ensure that the supplier's ICCs are satis¯ed by
paying a premium to the supplier. This makes the contract self-enforcing.
Note that, for now, we focus on a one-sided hold-up opportunity by the supplier, hence
we assume that there is no pro¯table hold-up opportunity for the processor, in the sense
that her reputation costs upon breach of contract are inhibitively high (e.g. Áp > µ). This
assumption is relaxed in the next section.
If Yb is smaller than Yh (as is Y 0
b in Figure 2), ICCs1 is not binding and hence it will
not a®ect the contract outcome. However, if Yb is larger than Yh (as for Y 1
b and Y 2
b in
Figure 2), it will a®ect the contract outcome. The processor must o®er the supplier at
least Yb in the contract. We de¯ne the increase in payment Yb ¡ Yh, that is required to
satisfy ICCs1, as the e±ciency premium (²).8
In our case, the e±ciency premium amounts to






µ ¡ Ás (11)
The e±ciency premium will thus be larger when the value of required inputs is higher
and when the supplier's reputation cost Ás is lower, re°ecting respectively larger opportu-
nity costs and lower informal enforcement.9
Hence, if Yb is as in Y 1
b in Figure 2, E0 cannot be an equilibrium, since the processor
8This is in analogy to the concept of e±ciency wages (Salop, 1979). Salop describes how a ¯rm can
minimize its employee's incentive to quit and seek a job elsewhere, by paying a higher wage. This is
pro¯table for the employer if it is expensive to train workers. The training cost of new workers is comparable
to the cost of providing inputs to suppliers on credit.
9This result corresponds to Bardhan and Udry's (1999: 218) ¯ndings. They mention that, in the context
of mercantile contracts, if there is no possibility to monitor, simple e±ciency-wages considerations suggest
that in order to keep along-distance trading agent honest, the agent has to be paid by the merchant (the
principle) a wage higher than the agent's reservation income. However, in more "collectivist" forms of
enforcement (in which e.g. the whole community is jointly liable if one of its members cheats), this wage
need not be as high, as the penalty for cheating is higher or else peer monitoring makes cheating more
di±cult.
12needs to ensure the supplier at least Y 1
b . E1 will be the new equilibrium. Notice that, in
this case, the supplier is better o® with enforcement costs than without.
However, for the contract to be feasible, the processor's and the supplier's participation
constraints should remain satis¯ed as well: ¦ ¸ ¦l and Y ¸ Yl. For example, if the ex
post outside option is too large, the e±ciency premium ² which the processor must pay to
the supplier in order to make the contract self-enforcing, may become so large that it is
no longer in the processor's interest to provide the contract. In Figure 2 this occurs when
Yb > Y 2
b . At that point, by paying an e±ciency premium, ¦h would fall below ¦l and
the processor's participation constraint is no longer satis¯ed. In other words, for Yb > Y 2
b ,
the supplier's ICCs1 is incompatible with the processor's PC. In this case, even though
the contract would be socially desirable (i.e. it would increase total income), it will not
emerge. This situation is referred to as "ine±cient separation".
From Section 3, recall that with perfect contract enforcement, input provision is sus-
tainable as long as the quality premium is at least as large as the additional cost of inputs
(i.e. µ ¸ I).10 Ine±cient separation does not occur. However, when contract enforcement
becomes costly, ine±cient separation may occur in a number of cases.
In our example above, ine±cient separation occurs when
I < µ < 2I ¡ Ás: (12)
because for µ < I it is not e±cient to contract, and for µ ¸ 2I ¡ Ás the surplus is high
enough to make the contract self-enforcing: the supplier has no incentive to breach the
contract.
Not surprisingly, reputation costs do play an important role. With Ás ¸ I, i.e. when
reputation costs are at least as high as input costs, condition (12) is never satis¯ed and
ine±cient separation never occurs. When there are no reputation costs (Ás = 0), then the
ine±cient separation condition becomes I < µ < 2I and the interval is largest: the quality
premium has to be at least double the investment cost per unit to make the contract
self-enforcing.
The impact of enforcement problems on contracting and its e±ciency and equity impli-
10Note that e±cient separation implies the socially e±cient breakdown of contracts, i.e. when µ < I.
13cations are illustrated by Figures 4 and 5.11 Figure 4 illustrates the surplus from high-value
production without external enforcement opportunities, and without supplier reputation
costs (Ás = 0). From equation (12) it follows that there is no contracting for µ < 2I. We re-
fer to the interval [I;2I] as the "ine±cient separation interval" (ISI). At µ = 2I, a contract
is self-enforcing and the e±ciency premium is equal to ² = 1
2I = 1
2Sh, i.e. the processor's
gains from contracting with perfect enforcement. The net bene¯t for the processor is there-
fore zero at µ = 2I. All the gains are for the supplier: ¢Y = Y ¡ Yl = 1
2Sh + ² = I = Sh.
With µ > 2I, the e±ciency premium will be lower (as the direct bene¯ts of the contract
for the supplier are higher). The reduction of the premium equals the increase in direct
bene¯ts and therefore the net contract gains for the supplier are constant with µ growing.
At the same time the gains for the processor grow for two reasons: the e±ciency premium
she has to pay to the supplier declines while her direct gains are larger. Both e®ects
reinforce each other to cause a strong growth in the bene¯ts for the processor over the
interval 2I · µ < 3I. When the quality premium equals 3I (or higher), the e±ciency
premium reduces to zero and the contract gains of the supplier and the processor are
equal (¢Y = ¢¦).
An important conclusion is that if only the supplier has the opportunity of doing a
hold-up, weak contract enforcement actually bene¯ts the supplier over the 2I · µ < 3I
interval, since his income is higher with no (or imperfect) external enforcement than with
perfect enforcement as Yb > Yh in that interval.12
Finally, Figure 5 illustrates the e®ect of reputation costs, which a®ect both the ef-
¯ciency and the distributional e®ects of contracting. Reputation costs will reduce the
ISI and the e±ciency premium.13 In Figure 5, Ás = 0:5I. In this case, the ISI reduces
to I < µ < 1:5I and the maximum e±ciency premium equals 0:25I (which is paid at
µ = 1:5I), compared to a maximum e±ciency payment of 0:5I with Ás = 0. In general, it
holds that if Ás is very high, ² is only due at very low values of µ.
11We assume in these ¯gures and the discussion that the processor's reputation cost is very high, such
that we must only take into account a possible hold-up by the supplier. We relax this in the next section.
12Note that we continue assuming that Á
s = 0.
13To see this, de¯ne reputation costs as a function of input costs, with Á
s = ¹I, with ¹ · 0. The ISI is
then de¯ned as I < µ < (2 ¡ ¹)I and the e±ciency premium as ² = (
3
2 ¡ ¹)I ¡
1
2µ. Both will reduce with
Á
s (and thus ¹) increasing.
144.2 E±ciency Premium with Two-Sided Hold-ups
So far, we have assumed that the reputation cost Áp of the processor was su±ciently high
to prevent her from holding up the supplier. However, this may not be the case. If the
contracted price is higher than the supplier's outside option after production (pl ¡C), the
buyer could ex post decide not to pay the contracted price, and push the supplier back to
his ex post outside option instead. Obviously, the processor would also su®er a reputation
loss (Áp) from holding up her counterpart. The pay-o®s in this case are:
Yr = pl ¡ C (13)
¦r = µ ¡ I ¡ Áp (14)
The price that the processor o®ers to the supplier is only credible if it results in a
payo® for the processor that is at least her payo® from breaking the contract. Hence, the
processor's incentive compatibility constraint is ¦ ¸ ¦r (ICCp), which, if not already
satis¯ed by ¦ = ¦h, may induce the supplier to accept a lower price for his produce to
guarantee contract enforcement. This will bene¯t both agents, as the resulting outcome
will be better than the outcome in case of contract breakdown, i.e. the disagreement out-
come. The price reduction that the supplier accepts, is equivalent to paying an e±ciency
premium (±) to the processor. It makes the contract self-enforcing and amounts to
± = ¦r ¡ ¦h =
1
2
(µ ¡ I) ¡ Áp (15)
The e±ciency premium to the processor will thus be increasing in the contract surplus
Sh = µ¡I, re°ecting the processor's opportunity costs from complying with the contract.
Similar to ², it is decreasing in Áp, i.e. the strength of informal enforcement.
As such, the possibility of a hold-up by the processor creates an upper bound to the
supplier's contract gains. This is shown in Figure 614 where contract formation and surplus
division are as in Figure 4, as long as µ is below 4I. However, when the quality premium
is high relative to the value of the required speci¯c inputs, the processor's ICC will be
binding. This creates an upper bound to the supplier's gains from the contract. In Figure
14Note that in this graph, we assign an arbitrary value of I to pl
156, this occurs for µ ¸ 4I. At µ = 4I, ¦r = ¦h = 1:5I. For any higher value of µ, ¦r
will be larger than ¦h, and if her contract income is only ¦h, the processor will have an
incentive to break the contract and pay the supplier Yr, i.e. push him back to his ex post
outside option. The supplier will be better o® by agreeing to a lower contract price, i.e.
by paying a negative e±ciency premium that amounts to ¦r ¡ ¦h = 1
2(µ ¡ I) ¡ Áp. For
Áp = 1:5I, this implies that ¢Y will remain constant at the level 1:5I for µ ¸ 4I. Note
that this is exactly the magnitude of Áp. Once the value of the contract µ exceeds 4I,
the processor extracts the whole surplus above this level. The processor's income is then
increasing at the same rate as S with µ. Note that if the processor's reputation cost from
contract breach (Áp) is very high, the negative e±ciency premium is only due at very high
values of µ; for lower values of µ, the supplier's bene¯ts increase strongly with µ.
Note that we have assumed that Áp = 1:5I. At this relatively high level of Áp, the
processor's outside option only has an impact on the distribution of S. It does not a®ect
the incidence of ine±cient separation. However, for low values of Áp and Ás, there may
be a con°ict between the supplier's ICCs1 and the processor's ICCp. This may result
in ine±cient separation. Take again the above example, but now assuming that Ás = 0
and Áp = 0:5I. Then, ICCp is satis¯ed if ¢Y · Áp hence ¢Y · 0:5I. If ¢Y > 0:5I, the
processor will hold up the supplier. In the meantime, ICCs1 requires that ¢Y ¸ I ¡ Ás
hence ¢Y ¸ I. If ¢Y < I, the supplier will hold up the processor. The range of ¢Y for
which a contract is feasible (i.e. 0:5I > ¢Y ¸ I), is empty. As a general rule, ine±cient
separation will occur over the whole domain of µ if the required I > Ás +Áp and e±ciency
premium payment is the only enforcement mechanism available.
5 Third Party Enforcement
Let us now complicate the model further by considering that contracts can also be enforced
by bringing in third parties at a cost M. We assume that M is the cost of guaranteed
enforcement: for example in case of contract breach by the supplier, a ¯ne Ã is imposed
on the supplier that is high enough to ensure that Yb ¡ Ã and Ys ¡ Ã are lower than Yh
under all conditions (for all possible values of the other exogenous parameters).15
15This will be the case if Ã ¸ I ¡ Á
s. In the case of ma±a or court enforcement Ã is like an e®ective
penalty on the supplier. In case of investing in a supervision system, the cost to the supplier is the loss of
16M could, for example, be the cost of hiring lawyers for a formal court of law.16 It could
also be the premium that must be paid in order to hire the local ma±a to enforce the
contract. Another way to interpret the third party enforcement cost is as the cost of setting
up a system to e®ectively monitor the application of inputs and the production and sales
of the high-value commodity. These costs can be very substantial. For example, Minten
et al. (2007) describe how a vegetable exporting company in Madagascar has invested in
an extensive supervision and monitoring system, including hundreds of specially trained
people, to monitor its suppliers.17 To analyze this, we assume that these costs are paid ex
ante (as in Dye (1985) and in Bajari and Tadelis (2001)), and as in the previous section,
we start with considering the case of a one-sided hold-up opportunity (where only the
supplier's ICC is relevant, e.g. by assuming Áp > µ). The case of a two-sided hold-up
opportunity (hence for Áp relatively low) is discussed in Section 5.2.
5.1 Supplier Hold-up
The processor will ¯rst compare which mechanism is the cheapest to enforce the contract:
by hiring a third party or by paying an e±ciency premium, and will then compare the
cost of the cheapest mechanism with her bene¯ts from the contract to see whether the
contract is still worth the while. More speci¯cally: including third party enforcement
costs, the gains for the processor of a contract are 1
2(µ ¡ I ¡ M). This will be cheaper
than paying an e±ciency premium if 1
2M < ², or, alternatively, if M < 2². Note that in
the former ine±cient separation interval [I;2I ¡ Ás], where the processor is not able to
pay an e±ciency premium, third party enforcement may render contracting viable. Here,
the processor will compare the cost of third party enforcement with the other costs and
bene¯ts from the contract, i.e. she will hire a third party if 1
2(µ ¡ I ¡ M) > 0, i.e. if
his gains from sideselling, which equal (I ¡ Á
s).
16The cost of pursuing a law suit is a measure of the quality of the legal system (MacLeod, 2006).
Djankov et al. (2003) study the variation of quality of law by country and by legal system.
17To monitor the correct implementation of the contracts of 10,000 small suppliers, the ¯rm has put
in place a strict hierarchical system of around 300 extension agents who are permanently on the payroll
of the company. Every extension agent, the chef de culture, is responsible for about thirty farmers. To
supervise these, (s)he coordinates ¯ve or six extension assistants ("assistant de culture") that live in the
village itself. The chef de culture has a permanent salary paid by the ¯rm. During the cultivation period
of the vegetables under contract, each supplier is monitored intensively (visits of more than once a week)
to ensure correct production management as well as to avoid side-selling. For some crucial aspects of
the vegetable production process, such as pesticide application, representatives of the company will even
intervene in the production management to ensure it is rightly done (Minten et al., 2007).
17M < µ ¡I. This is illustrated in Figure 7, with M = 0:5I. Observe that with Ás = 0, the
processor will hire a third party over the domain [1:5I;2:5I]. With µ between 1:5I and 2I,
hiring a third party is the only option to enforce contracts. If µ is between 2I and 2:5I,
third party enforcement is cheaper for the processor than paying an e±ciency premium
to the supplier. At µ = 2:5I, she is indi®erent between both systems, but at µ > 2:5I she
will prefer paying an e±ciency premium since this is cheaper.
The implications for equity and e±ciency are as follows. The availability of third party
enforcement has a positive e®ect on e±ciency in the range I < µ < 2I ¡ Ás (I < µ < 2I
if Ás = 0) as there, it induces the shift from a low-quality equilibrium to a high-quality
equilibrium and it bene¯ts both the supplier and the processor.
However, if µ > 2I¡Ás but M < 2² (as is the case for the interval 2I < µ < 2:5I), third
party enforcement will simply replace e±ciency premium payment. Overall, this results
in a loss M, the cost of enforcement to society.18 The payo® of the supplier decreases
from Yh + ² to Yh ¡ 1
2M. The processor's payo® improves from ¦h ¡ ² to ¦h ¡ 1
2M. For
M > 2², the availability of third party enforcement does not have any impact as it is still
too expensive as an enforcement device.
5.2 Two-Sided Hold-ups
If the processor's reputation cost Áp is low, such that there may be an incentive for the
processor to hold up her supplier, the supplier will also consider third parties to enforce
the contracts (at a cost M). This is illustrated in Figure 8 (which assumes that M = 0:5I,
Ás = 0, Áp = I).
The processor will act as in Section 5.1. If ¦r > ¦h, to avoid a hold-up by the
processor, the supplier will pay an e±ciency premium ± to the processor as long as ± < 1
2M.
Otherwise, he will appeal to third party enforcement. Figure 8 shows how the contract
will be made self-enforcing through payment of an e±ciency premium ± to the processor
for µ 2 [3I;3:5I]. For µ > 3:5I, third party enforcement will be invoked.
The implications for e±ciency and equity are shown in Figure 8. S represents the
18Notice that in this paper, we consider the social gains of the contract as the sum of the gains of the
supplier and the processor. As such, M is a cost to society. One could argue that payments to third
parties, be it ma¯osi, lawyers or local people hired to supervise, also bene¯t society and should be included
in the gains, rather than costs.
18e®ectively realized surplus for the contracting parties, and as before ¢Y = 1
2S +²¡± and
¢¦ = 1
2S ¡ ² + ± where ² ¸ 0 or ± ¸ 0 is the e±ciency premium with ²;± > 0 if used
as an enforcement device. Where third party enforcement is chosen (1:5I < µ < 2:5I and
µ > 3:5I), ¢¦ = ¢Y = 1
2S = 1
2(µ¡I ¡M) if ¯ = 0:5. Contracting is now possible with µ
between 1:5I and 2I and surplus can be created in this interval (compared to when there
was no third party enforcement). Hence, ine±cient separation is less likely with third
party enforcement. However, in contrast to the e±ciency premium, the cost of third party
enforcement (M) to the processor does not bene¯t the supplier. Hence, the surplus S of
the contract is lower by an amount M for 2I < µ < 2:5I and µ > 3:5I.
Note that if the processor's reputation cost from contract breach (Áp) is very high, the
negative e±ciency premium is only due at very high values of µ, and for lower levels of µ,
the supplier's bene¯ts increase strongly with µ.
Finally, in a broader framework, it should be pointed out that the private costs of the
absence of a public enforcement system di®er depending on the size of µ ¡ I. At low and
(very) high levels of µ ¡ I, the costs are equal to the private costs of organizing third
party enforcement. At intermediate levels of µ ¡ I, these costs are lower as a system of
self-enforcing contracts, with or without e±ciency premia, can be designed.
6 Development
Development is a broad concept and is both cause and consequence of the formation of
interlinked contracts. Here we look speci¯cally at the impact of changes in two factors
which we assume to be determined exogenously and which coincide with "development":
the improvement of the functioning of factor markets and the improvement of (public) en-
forcement of contracts. First, if factor markets develop, producers' access to speci¯c inputs
will become less constrained, and this will obviously a®ect contractual arrangements. Sec-
ond, if enforcement will be less costly with the emergence and better functioning of formal
institutions, this will also a®ect the emergence and the distributional e®ects of interlinked
contracts. To precisely identify the mechanisms, we analyze these e®ects separately.
196.1 Factor market development
As factor markets develop, suppliers can get access to inputs directly. It will no longer be
necessary for processing ¯rms to provide input on credit to their suppliers. Contracts are
no longer interlinked. They may still be used to ensure an output market for the supplier
and/or a su±cient supply of quality raw material ¯tting for the buyer. We refer to this as
a "pure" output contract.
The only option for contract breach by the supplier is now selling his high quality
products at the local market. If, as we have assumed in Section 4, the local market values
the high-quality product only as much as a low-quality product, the supplier's only outside
option (Y d
s = pl ¡ C ¡ I ¡ Áp) would make him worse o® than the disagreement payo®
Yl = pl ¡ C.19 Hence, the supplier has no incentive to break the contract; the processor
faces no enforcement problems.
On the other hand, the processor's ex post outside option improves, as she has not paid
for the input costs of the supplier. Her contract breach outcome will change to ¦d
r = µ¡Áp.
This is higher (by a magnitude I) than in (14), where the processor is providing inputs to
the supplier. This may create an incentive for hold-up of the supplier if ¦h < ¦d
r. Then
the supplier needs to pay for contract enforcement, either through an e±ciency premium,
or through third party enforcement. In a pure output contract, as her outside option has





(µ ¡ I) + I ¡ Áp: (16)
Obviously, as explained before, third party enforcement can substitute for this e±ciency
premium whenever the latter is more costly than the former.
What are the implications for equity and e±ciency? Interestingly, an analysis shows
that these e®ects are not straightforward and depend importantly on the economic con-
ditions and institutional parameters. The comparison between Figures 8 and 9 illustrates
these e®ects. Figure 9 presents the same situation as Figure 8 but for a pure output
contract instead of an interlinked contract.
19Note that the local market valuation of the high-quality product may as well increase relative to its
valuation of the low-quality product, as markets (and tastes) develop. This will be discussed in a following
working paper.
206.1.1 E±ciency
First, one would expect e±ciency to go up with the reduction of factor market imperfec-
tions. This is indeed the case for a certain range of values of µ. Since the processor needs
no longer fear contract breach by the supplier, the processor does not need to use any
enforcement mechanism to inhibit opportunistic behaviour by the supplier.
As a consequence, it does no longer happen that to make the supplier comply with the
contract, the processor needs to pay him a premium that is so large that she would make
loss because of that. With other words, ine±cient separation due to an incompatibility
between the supplier's ICCs and the processor's PCp does no longer arise.
In Figure 9, an example is in interval [I;1:5I], hence at low values of µ. While ine±cient
separation would occur over this interval if the supplier would have needed to rely on
interlinked contracts to have access to inputs, the high quality equilibrium can be realised
at low values of µ if the supplier is providing his own inputs.
However, secondly, the fact that the processor is no longer providing inputs to the
supplier, also means that she is less "tied" into the contract. She has not done a speci¯c
investment in the contract, in terms of input provision to the farmer. This makes the
supplier more subject to opportunistic behaviour by the processor.
As a result, the supplier may need to use more resources on contract enforcement.
As the required e±ciency premium becomes more expensive in this case, the supplier is
more likely to resort to third party enforcement to protect himself against contract breach.
This behaviour will clearly a®ect e±ciency as well. In Figure 9, an example is in interval
[2:5I;3:5I], where e±ciency is reduced compared to the interlinked case in Figure 8 due
to the increased cost of inhibiting breach of contract by the processor.
Note that when Áp < I, the supplier's PCs and the processor's ICCp can never be
simultaneously satis¯ed. Indeed, for Áp < I, the e±ciency premium that the supplier
needs to pay to the processor to give her the incentive to comply with the contract is
very high. It is so high that if the supplier pays for it, his own participation constraint
is violated. In this case, the supplier prefers not to sign a contract at all. Note that
ine±cient separation is in this case independent of µ.20 In Figure 9, Áp > I hence no
20In case Á
p < I, ine±cient separation may for example still be overcome by sharing the investment
costs (i.e. the cost of the inputs) between the processor and the supplier (cfr. Gow and Swinnen, 2001).
21ine±cient separation occurs at all.
6.1.2 Equity
It is obvious that if interlinking is not feasible, the supplier is at least as good o® with a
pure output contract than with no contract at all. However, if interlinking is feasible, the
supplier will be better o® with an interlinked contract than with a pure output contract.
The main reason is that his own outside option is lower in a pure output contract, while
his counterparty's outside option improves.
More speci¯cally, in a pure output contract, the supplier will no longer receive an
e±ciency premium (at any value of µ). Instead, he will need to pay more for contract
enforcement, either by paying 1
2M for third party enforcement or by paying an e±ciency
premium ±d to the processor.21 This will reduce the supplier's income from the contract.
The size of the loss varies with µ.
For example, when we compare Figure 8 and Figure 9, we see that for µ = 2:5I, the
supplier's extra income from an interlinked contract is I (see Figure 8), while it is 0:5I in
a pure output contract (see Figure 9).
Furthermore, at low values of µ (µ 2 [I;1:5I]), although there is no longer ine±cient
separation, the supplier continues to earn only his disagreement outcome from the con-
tract, as the whole contract surplus is required as an e±ciency premium to the processor,
to ensure contract compliance.
Hence, as a conclusion, we can say that improving factor markets may or may not
bene¯t the supplier. It may bene¯t him in the sense that as he gets access to inputs
by himself, there is no ine±cient separation anymore (as long as Áp > I). Hence, the
high-quality equilibrium can be achieved, also at low values of µ (see Figure 9, interval
[I;1:5I]).
However, the share of total income which accrues to the supplier may be lower in a
pure output contract than in an interlinked contract. In Figure 9, this is the case at low
(µ 2 [I;1:5I]) and intermediate values of µ (µ 2 [2:5I;3:5I]).
21For some values of µ, he will need to pay an e±ciency premium where he did not have to pay one
before, and at other values he will need to pay a higher premium than before.
226.2 Improvement of contract enforcement institutions
A second e®ect that occurs with development is that enforcement institutions become
more e®ective and, hence, external enforcement becomes less costly. One way to model
this e®ect is as a decrease in M, the cost of hiring a third party to ensure enforcement. An
obvious implication is that enforcement will occur in more circumstances (for a larger range
of µ) and that third party enforcement will be preferred to e±ciency premium payment.
This will have both e±ciency and equity implications.
We also ¯rst analyze this e®ect separately. Hence, consider again the case of interlinked
contracts instead of pure output contracts. Figure 10 illustrates the e®ect of a reduction
in M (in comparison with Figure 8).
6.2.1 E±ciency
First, a decreased M will extend the range where contracts are enforceable. Indeed, as
M decreases, there is a wider interval for which µ ¡ I ¡ M > 0. While the ine±cient
separation interval is [I;1:5I] with M = 0:5I (see Figure 8), it reduces to [I;1:25I] with
M = 0:25I (see Figure 10).
Second, when third party enforcement was already the cheapest option for contract
enforcement with a higher M (cfr. Figure 8 for µ 2 [1:5I;2:5I] or µ > 3I), third party
enforcement now becomes cheaper. This increases the contract surplus, with a positive
e®ect on e±ciency.
However, thirdly, as the cost of third party enforcement decreases, it will substitute for
e±ciency premium payment for certain values of µ. Indeed, as explained in Section 5.1, a
processor will appeal to third party enforcement if M < 2², with ² = 3
2I¡1
2µ¡Ás. Likewise,
the supplier will appeal to third party enforcement if M < 2± with ± = 1
2(µ ¡ I) ¡ Áp.
Hence, the smaller M, the wider the range of µ in which the processor or the supplier
will invoke third party enforcement instead of an e±ciency premium. This will a®ect the
contract surplus S. Indeed, S = µ ¡ I ¡ M where third party enforcement is employed,
while S = µ ¡ I where the e±ciency premium is employed. If M is employed over a
wider interval, this obviously reduces S over a wider interval. In Figure 10, e±ciency
is reduced at intermediate values of µ; more speci¯cally for the intervals [2:5I;2:75] and
23[3:25I;3:5I].22
6.2.2 Equity
Where cheaper third party enforcement will substitute for e±ciency premia, the distribu-
tion of the contract surplus will also be a®ected.23 Indeed, in Figure 8, where M = 0:5I,
e±ciency premium payment is used to enforce contracts for µ 2 [2:5I;3:5I]. In Fig-
ure 10, where M = 0:25I, e±ciency premium payment is only used to that purpose for
µ 2 [2:75I;3:25I]. This leads to an income loss for those bene¯ting from the payment.
For example, in the case where µ = 2:5I, the supplier receives an e±ciency premium if
M = 0:5I. However, if M = 0:25I, he no longer receives one. His income is reduced, while
the processor's income increases, as her share of the payment to third parties is lower than
the e±ciency payment.24
Another case is where µ = 3:5I. At this value of µ, the processor receives an e±ciency
premium if M = 0:5I. At M = 0:25I, she no longer receives one. Her income is reduced,
while the supplier's income improves.
A third case is at µ = 1:4I. With M = 0:5I, contracting was not enforceable while it
is possible with M = 0:25I, as third party enforcement is feasible. The resulting contract
surplus µ ¡ I ¡ M is equally shared by the processor and the supplier, who are thus both
bene¯ting from cheaper third party enforcement in this case.
As a conclusion, we can state that both parties may bene¯t from cheaper enforcement
where lower enforcement costs allow to overcome ine±cient separation. However, perhaps
surprisingly, improved enforcement institutions do not necessarily bene¯t both contracting
parties in all circumstances. Indeed, for some values of µ, only one of the contract partners
will gain, and the other will lose as cheaper third party enforcement will deprive the latter
agent from his/her e±ciency premium, and reduce his/her income. This is consistent with
other literature (e.g. Anderson and Young, 2002), stating that better enforcement does
22Note that there is a status quo for µ 2 [2:75I;3:25I], where e±ciency premium payment still remains
cheaper than third party enforcement.
23Note that, as institutions develop, trade tends to be more formalized. People will rely less on social
capital or on peer monitoring techniques. If reputation costs Á
p and Á
s decrease, e±ciency premia get
more expensive, reenforcing the former e®ect.
24However, the processor's gain is not enough to fully compensate for the supplier's loss: total contract
surplus decreases as well.
24not necessarily bene¯t contracting agents.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes how weak contract enforcement institutions and imperfect factor
markets are a®ecting contract arrangements between agricultural suppliers and buyers in
development, and what the implications are for income distribution and growth.
Our main ¯ndings are that factor market imperfections induce interlinked contract
arrangements, and that the extent of ine±cient separation (absence of socially e±cient
interlinked contracts) is proportional to the size of the enforcement costs and the relation-
ship speci¯c investment. The distribution of the gains from contracting depend on the
overall rent that can be created by it.
Transfers from one agent to the other, which we call "e±ciency premia", play a crucial
role. With positive enforcement costs in contracting, an e±ciency premium may have to
be paid by one agent to the other in order to enforce the contract. The size of the e±ciency
premium depends on the enforcement costs and on the rents created by the contract. We
¯nd that the higher the enforcement costs, the higher the e±ciency premium.
Moreover, we ¯nd that "development", i.e. an exogenous improvement of enforcement
institutions and of the functioning of credit markets has non-linear e®ects on both equity
and e±ciency, and may hurt some of the contracting parties under some conditions.
More speci¯cally, the analysis shows that with factor market development, interlinked
agreements will be less needed. Moreover, as enforcement institutions develop, it will be
cheaper to enforce contracts through third-party enforcement and e±ciency premia are
less likely.
In general, e±ciency will increase. First, because the incidence of ine±cient separation
is expected to diminish; second, because third party enforcement is becoming cheaper and
therefore has a less depressing impact on the contract surplus.
Nevertheless, for some values of µ, e±ciency rather decreases, as third party enforce-
ment is substituting for e±ciency premium payment.
Further, especially for lower values of µ, the share of total income that accrues to
the supplier may go down with development, as he misses out on his e±ciency premium.
25On the other hand, especially for intermediate to higher values of µ, the supplier may
as well gain from cheaper third party enforcement as it decreases the cost of inhibiting
opportunistic behaviour by the processor.
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30Figure 2: Interlinking with hold-up opportunities for the supplier
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34Figure 7: Enforcement Mechanism Choice and Surplus Sharing; One-Sided Hold-up
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35Figure 8: Enforcement Mechanism Choice and Surplus Sharing; Two-Sided Hold-up
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37Figure 10: Enforcement Mechanism Choice and Surplus Sharing; E®ect of Development
of contract enforcement institutions (Decreasing M)
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